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Abstract
A large literature, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that delegation
of authority and incentives should have a positive relationship. Using data
from a large cross section of British establishments, we show that the positive
relationship between incentives and delegation that has been consistently doc-
umented in the empirical literature masks a stark difference between job types.
We classify jobs into two categories: complex jobs include professional, techni-
cal and scientific occupations and simple jobs consist of all other occupations
with a lower-level code in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) sys-
tem. We find that for simple jobs, the relationship between delegation and
incentives is positive as has been found in the previous literature, whereas for
complex jobs it is negative. To explain this negative relationship for complex
jobs, we develop a model where tasks have a risk-return tradeoff and where a
single performance measure has to induce both task selection and effort. We
find that if tasks vary sufficiently by risk and return and if effort is noisy to
measure, then delegation and incentives have a negative relationship.
1 Introduction
A central question in organizations concerns the allocation of decision rights. That
is, to what extent should workers be given the authority to select the tasks they per-
form on the job? Delegating authority to workers can be beneficial because workers
often have better information about the tasks they perform than their employers.
But workers’ preferences over these tasks may differ from those of their employer,
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and this mismatch in preferences biases worker decisions. The resulting tradeoff be-
tween information and bias in decision making is at the center of several theoretical
models (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Jensen and Meckling (1992), Prender-
gast (2002), Itoh, Kikutani, and Hayashida (2008), Rantakari (2008)) and has the
following implication. When workers are delegated authority, incentives must be
stronger.1 Stronger incentives ensure that, when choosing tasks and making other
decisions, workers place less weight on their private benefits and more weight on the
expected returns to their employer. Thus, authority and incentives are positively
related.
This theoretical prediction has motivated an empirical literature to identify the
sign of the relationship between authority and incentives. Some of the evidence is
based on particular industries or types of jobs. Nagar (2002) finds that bank man-
agers with more authority receive more incentive-based pay. Colombo and Delmas-
tro (2004) analyze a sample of manufacturing plants and their parent companies
in the Italian metalworking sector, finding that delegating authority to the plant
manager is more likely when monetary incentives are introduced. Wulf (2007) uses
compensation survey data on division managers and finds that corporate officers
with broader authority (for example, presidents, vice presidents and Chief Financial
Officers of a business unit, division, or function) are more likely than non-officers
with less authority to have their pay tied to global performance measures such as
firm sales growth. Itoh, Kikutani, and Hayashida (2008) use data on Japanese busi-
ness groups and find that delegation of authority from a core firm to an affiliated
firm is positively correlated with an accountability measure. Other evidence is based
on broader cross sectional samples of workers spanning a variety of industries and
job types. MacLeod and Parent (1999) find that workers with more “autonomy” are
more likely to be paid commissions. Foss and Laursen (2005), using data on Danish
firms, and DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010), using survey data on British establishments,
find a positive relationship between delegation and incentives.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, all of the preceding empirical studies
have found a positive relationship between delegation and incentives.2 However,
striking counterexamples can be seen in certain jobs. Consider the following ex-
ample involving cardiac surgeons. A crucial decision that a cardiology unit must
make is when to perform a surgical procedure like a coronary angioplasty on a pa-
tient. For some patients, surgery may be a routine procedure with low risks. For
other patients, surgery may yield very high returns but this comes with substantial
risk. The unit must thus decide on a threshold level of risk-return above which
surgeries are not performed. The unit has two alternatives for delegating author-
ity. One is to review all of the patients that a surgeon sees and verify the patient’s
1The strength of incentives in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Prendergast (2002) is mea-
sured by the slope of a linear, output-contingent compensation contract.
2The only prior evidence we are aware of suggesting a negative relationship is a bivariate corre-
lation appearing in Table 5 of Ortega (2009), based on cross sectional data from the EU-15 group.
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risk-return characteristics before recommending surgery. Another is to leave the
decision to operate with a surgeon. Noting that a common performance measure
used for incentives in cardiac units is whether a patient survives surgery, consider
what happens when a surgeon who can select a treatment plan has his pay tied
more closely to his patients’ mortality rates. Because this incentive scheme imposes
risk on the surgeon, a risk-averse surgeon may choose not to operate on a high-risk
patient even though surgery might help that patient. In fact, survey evidence sug-
gests that in an overwhelming number of cases, incentives based on mortality rates
lead surgeons to avoid risky but potentially beneficial surgeries.3 Such behavior has
negative implications both for the reputation of the cardiology unit and for public
health.
The preceding example highlights a tradeoff that the cardiology unit faces when
it strengthens incentives. Incentive pay can induce a surgeon to work harder but
at the same time distorts the surgeon’s decisions concerning how to treat patients.
If effort is very noisy (as is the case with surgeons), the benefits from increased
effort are outweighed by the costs of distortions in treatment plans. This in turn
suggests that incentives must be muted when surgeons can select treatment plans for
patients. We believe that this tradeoff between inducing effort and selecting tasks
is not unique to cardiac surgeons and that it plays a role in many other high-level
jobs. For example, tying academics’ pay to the number of research papers published
leads to academics pursuing safe research topics and publication strategies. Tying
scientists’ pay to the commercial success of a product leads scientists to be cautious
when developing features of a product. Likewise, legal and financial advisors are
likely to give conservative advice if their pay depends on final outcomes. Note that
in all of these examples, effort is noisy to measure, which reduces the benefits of
incentive pay.
These counterexamples to the standard theoretical prediction provide the moti-
vation for this paper, which is to explore how the relationship between incentives
and delegation varies across occupations. We classify jobs into two broad categories.
Complex jobs are those for which task selection is valuable and for which effort is
noisy to measure, as in the preceding examples. The jobs we include in this cate-
gory are professional, and technical and scientific jobs, which are higher-level codes
in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system. Simple jobs, on the
other hand, consist of clerical and secretarial occupations, craft and skilled manual
occupations, personal service occupations, sales occupations, operative and assem-
bly manual occupations, and routine unskilled manual occupations. We believe that
in most cases task selection is less valuable and that effort is easier to measure for
these jobs.4
3“Cardiologists Say Rankings Sway Choices on Surgery”, The New York Times, January 11,
2005. Also see Leventis (1997) and Dranove, Kessler, McClellan, and Satterthwaite (2003) for
empirical work on this topic.
4The following examples motivate our assumption that effort is more noisy to measure in the
case of complex jobs. For the case of a windshield installer, which is classified as a simple job, it is
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Using data from the 1998 British WERS – a nationally representative survey of
British establishments that also contains survey information from up to 25 workers
per establishment – we document a new empirical finding, namely that the positive
relationship between incentives and delegation that has been reported in the empir-
ical literature masks a stark difference between these two broad job types. We find
that for simple jobs, the relationship between delegation and incentives is positive,
as has been found in the previous literature, whereas for complex jobs it is negative,
as in the example involving cardiac surgeons.
Documenting this new empirical result is the first contribution of the paper.
The second contribution is to provide a potential theoretical explanation for the
negative relationship between delegation and incentives for complex jobs. To do
this, we develop a model with two features that are central to the example involving
cardiac surgeons. The first is that a worker who is delegated authority can select
the tasks on which he exerts effort, and these tasks have a positive risk-return
tradeoff. Second, employers only have a single performance measure with which to
induce both task selection and effort. These two features lead to a simple tradeoff.
Stronger incentives on the performance measure, as is standard in many agency
models, induce higher effort. But stronger incentives on the performance measure
also lead the worker (when given authority to choose tasks) to inefficiently select a
low risk-return task. Thus the employer must decide whether to induce effort or task
selection. When tasks vary sufficiently in terms of their return and when output is
a noisy measure of effort, then the employer prefers to induce task selection. And
when tasks vary sufficiently by risk, this leads to a negative relationship between
delegation and incentives. We think that this sufficient condition for the negative
relationship between authority and incentives, i.e. high variation in task risk and
returns and noise in measuring effort, is likely to hold in many jobs in the “complex”
category.
Our work is related to some other theory papers that examine incentives for
project selection. Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider a setting where projects
vary by risk and return to study optimal capital structure. Their focus, however,
is on excessive risk taking induced by debt contracts. Hirshleifer and Suh (1992)
show how convexity in incentive schemes induces risky project selection but distorts
effort. Hence, their focus is on the curvature of the contract rather than the level of
incentives or delegation. Demski and Dye (1999) consider a setting with a risk-return
tradeoff, where contracts are designed not to influence a worker’s project selection
but rather to elicit a manager’s private information about a project’s attributes.
Lambert (1986) and Core and Qian (2002) also study incentives for the selection
of risky projects. Athey and Roberts (2001) show that in a setting with multiple
agents, relative performance evaluation mitigates the adverse effects of risk that are
relatively easy to back out the effort of an installer by checking the windshield. For the case of a
cardiac surgeon, on the other hand, it may be more difficult to back out the actions that a surgeon
took at the end of a surgery.
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borne by individual agents, as long as error terms are common or correlated across
agents. However, this distorts project choice because the agent places negative
weight on components of the project that show up in the performance measures of
other agents. Their framework is different because they do not have a positive risk-
return tradeoff across projects. Our paper is also similar in spirit to Baker (1992)
in that performance measures are limited in terms of inducing efficient outcomes.
In his setting, however, the limitation arises from a divergence between the true
benefit of the principal and the performance measure, whereas in our framework the
limitation arises because the performance measure cannot disentangle effort from
task selection. In both his paper and ours, noise associated with the performance
measure and risk aversion of the agent make the problem worse. Recent papers
by Manso (2011) and Ederer and Manso (2008) show how tolerating early failure
in a dynamic setting encourages innovation. Once again, they do not consider a
positive risk-return tradeoff across projects. Furthermore, they do not consider
delegation of authority, nor do they conduct empirical tests.5 In independently
developed work, Lando (2004) constructs an example with a positive risk-return
tradeoff across projects where delegation and incentives can be substitutes. His
focus, however, is on the relative distortions between a principal and agent choosing
projects when both cannot commit in advance to the projects they choose.
Our paper also relates to a large literature investigating various aspects of dele-
gation of authority. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show how delegation of authority pro-
vides incentives for an agent to exert effort (i.e. acquire information about projects).
Bester and Krahmer (2008) also look at the incentive role of delegation, but in a
setting in which projects are selected before the agent exerts effort and in which
it is possible to contract on output. They find, in contrast to Aghion and Tirole
(1997), that when higher effort must be induced, delegation is less likely. Though
this could imply a negative relationship between delegation and the incentive level
for an output-contingent contract, they do not emphasize this as a result. Other
papers examine the tradeoff between information and bias to characterize the set-
tings in which delegation is optimal (Dessein (2002), Alonso and Matouschek (2008),
Marino and Matsusaka (2005)). Whereas our paper uses a moral hazard framework,
an alternative approach studies delegation in an adverse selection setting (Mookher-
jee (2006)). Raith (2008) is another paper outside of a delegation framework that
studies incentives when an agent has better information (i.e. specific knowledge)
than the principal. Finally, Van den Steen (2007) considers a setting where the
principal and agent differ in their priors and focuses on a different notion of author-
ity, based on the agent obeying orders. He finds that agents at the receiving end of
authority (i.e. who are given orders by a principal) optimally have lower powered
incentives.
5Other papers that study incentives for innovation outside of a delegation context are Nagaoka
and Owan (2008) and Hellmann and Thiele (2008).
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2 Data and Empirical Analysis
In this section we provide empirical evidence concerning how the relationship be-
tween incentives and authority differs between complex and simple jobs. Our data
are drawn from both the management and worker questionnaires in the 1998 British
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), jointly sponsored by the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, ACAS, the Economic and Social Research Council, and
the Policy Studies Institute.6 Distributed via the UK Data Archive, the WERS data
are a nationally representative stratified random sample covering British workplaces
with at least ten employees, except for those in the following 1992 Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC) divisions: agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing; min-
ing and quarrying; private households with employed persons; and extra-territorial
organizations. Some of the 3192 workplaces targeted were found to be out of scope,
and the final sample size of 2191 implies a net response rate of 80.4% (Cully, Wood-
land, O’Reilly, and Dix (1999)) after excluding the out-of-scope cases.7 Data were
collected between October 1997 and June 1998 via face-to-face interviews. The re-
spondent in the management questionnaire was usually the most senior manager at
the workplace with responsibility for employment relations.8
A set of inverse probability sampling weights accompanies the 1998 WERS, and
applying those “establishment weights” is necessary to ensure that the resulting
statistics reflect a nationally representative sample of British workplaces. The sam-
pling weights adjust for a number of factors influencing the probability of selection,
including establishment size, major SIC group, and whether the establishment was
included in the 1990 WIRS (the predecessor of the 1998 WERS). For details see
pages 124-126 of Section 7.1 of the 1998 WERS technical appendix, Cully (1999).
We use these weights throughout the analysis, referring to all results as “establish-
ment weighted”.
To distinguish complex from simple jobs, we rely on one-digit and two-digit
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes for each establishment’s largest
occupational group. There are nine one-digit codes, and we rely on these categoriza-
6Although a 2004 wave of the survey is available, for our purposes the 1998 wave is superior
for two reasons. First, it contains more information on incentive pay within the establishment.
Second, using the 1998 data means that our results are directly comparable to those in DeVaro
and Kurtulus (2010) which used the same data set and the same measures of the key variables to
examine the relationship between incentive pay and delegation, neglecting the distinction between
complex and simple jobs.
7The “scope” is workplaces with 10 or more employees located in Great Britain (England,
Scotland and Wales) and engaged in activities within Sections D (Manufacturing) to O (Other
Community, Social and Personal Services) of the 1992 Standard Industrial Classification. The
survey covers both the private and public sectors. If a case is sampled that does not meet these
parameters, it is called “out of scope.”
8Our measures of the two key variables (i.e. incentive pay and delegation) as well as controls for
firm characteristics and the degree of risk in the production environment are defined as in DeVaro
and Kurtulus (2010).
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tions to define jobs broadly as either complex or simple in the following definition:
Complex = 1 if the establishment’s largest occupational group is “Professional
occupations” or “Technical, scientific occupations” (= 0 if the establishment’s largest
occupational group is “Clerical and secretarial occupations” or “Craft and skilled
manual occupations” or “Personal service occupations” or “Sales occupations” or
“Operative and assembly manual occupations” or “Routine unskilled manual occu-
pations”).
Panel 1 of Appendix A displays the detailed two-digit and three-digit codes
underlying the broad occupational group we refer to as “complex jobs”. Panel 2
displays the one-digit codes underlying the group we define as “simple jobs”. Al-
though our categorization of jobs was the most reasonable two-group classification
that occurred to us, we acknowledge that any binary cut of occupations into broad
categories such as “complex” and “simple” is arbitrary, and it will be possible to
identify certain jobs within those categories for which the classification is question-
able.
A small number of observations (i.e. 14) have the establishment’s largest occu-
pational group reported as “Managers and senior administrative occupations”. It
seems rather unusual to us that this group would be the largest in any organization
(i.e. in the typical case observed in practice and described by theoretical models,
a manager would be supervising other workers). For this reason, and given that
we are particularly interested in studying occupations that have not been examined
in previous work, (namely non-managerial occupations to which two of our three
measures of incentive pay pertain), we drop these 14 observations. In some sense, we
believe that the positive relationship between incentive pay and delegation should
hold for managers. We find that if we add managers to the analysis, our results
weaken a bit, as we would expect.
The relevant theoretical notion of the strength of incentive pay is the slope of an
output-based compensation contract. Such a continuous measure of incentive pay
is unavailable in the WERS, so we rely on three categorical measures, defined from
the management survey. The first is:
Incentive Pay = 1 if any employees at the workplace received payments or divi-
dends from individual performance-related schemes (= 0 otherwise).9
A potential criticism of our first measure is that an establishment might be
9The survey asks what measures of performance are used for awarding incentive pay to non-
managerial workers who are eligible for it (i.e. “1 = Individual performance / output”, “2 =
Group or team performance / output”, “3 = Workplace-based measures”, “4 = Organisation-based
measures”). We classify the incentive pay measure as 0 if “individual performance / output” was not
one of the reported performance criteria, so the measure equals 1 only when we can be certain that
individual-based performance measures are used. If performance pay is used at the establishment
but no non-managerial occupations are eligible for it, we have no information on what performance
measures are used. This occurs in fewer than 15 percent of cases, and in such cases we classify the
incentive pay measure as 1, following DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010).
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classified as using incentive pay even if very few workers (perhaps just a single
worker) receive such pay. Our second and third measures are less susceptible to this
problem. Our second measure is defined as follows, where the suffix “l.o.g.” denotes
“largest occupational group”:
Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) = 1 if any employees in the establishment’s largest occu-
pational group received payments or dividends from individual performance-related
schemes (= 0 otherwise).
One advantage of using Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) as the dependent variable is that
Complex is defined with respect to the establishment’s largest occupational group,
which strengthens the compatibility between Complex and the dependent variable.
As was true of our first measure of incentive pay, the actual survey question under-
lying the second measure permits group-based as well as individual-based incentive
schemes, so we corrected the second measure so that it indicates when individual-
based performance-related pay schemes are used (see footnote 9).
Our third binary measure, capturing whether non-managerial workers at the
establishment received individual performance-related pay in the last year, is defined
as follows:10
Incentive Pay (n.m.) = 1 if at least some non-managerial workers received
individual performance-related pay in the last year (= 0 otherwise).
As with our first two measures, we corrected the third measure to ensure that it
pertains to individual-based performance-related schemes (see footnote 9).
Our measure of delegation is derived from the worker survey. A random sample of
up to 25 employees per establishment was surveyed and asked the following question:
“In general, how much influence do you have about the range of tasks you do in
your job?”
Potential responses were “a lot”, “some”, “a little”, and “none.” Since our mea-
sures of incentive pay and Complex are establishment-wide measures, within each
establishment we aggregate the individual worker responses to the delegation ques-
tion by taking the modal worker response, as in DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010).11 The
logic is that the most frequently occurring worker response to the delegation ques-
tion within an establishment reflects the degree of delegation faced by the typical
worker in the workplace. Thus, our delegation measure is defined as follows:
Delegation = 1 if the modal worker in the establishment responds “a lot”; (= 0
if the modal worker’s response is “none”, “a little”, or “some”).
10In the raw data this measure appears as polychotomous with the following 7 categories: 1 =
“None 0%”, 2 = “Just a few 1-19%”, 3 = “Some 20-39%”, 4 = “Around half 40-59%”, 5 = “Most
60-79%”, 6 = “Almost all 80-99%”, 7 = “All 100%”.
11In DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010) the results were largely unaffected if worker responses were
aggregated to the establishment level using the median rather than the modal response. In the
present context our results are more sensitive to this alternative measure, and the coefficient of the
key interaction term becomes statistically insignificant.
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The control variables are defined in Appendix B and include establishment size,
main activity of the establishment, industry, whether the firm has a single estab-
lishment or multiple establishments, ownership (private versus public, franchise
versus non-franchise, publicly traded versus non-publicly traded), single-product
or multiple-product, fraction of part-time workers, temporary workers, fixed-term
workers under one year, fixed-term workers over one year, number of recognized
unions, and whether the establishment has been operation for more than five years.
Some of the variables in our analysis contain missing values, and we estimate all of
our models using listwise deletion. The main source of missing information is Del-
egation, since only 1782 of the 2191 establishments reported any worker responses
to the survey question underlying this variable. Models that control for risk in the
production environment also have smaller sample sizes, since the underlying survey
question was asked only in the trading sector. Descriptive statistics for all variables
in our analysis are displayed in Table 1.
The conventional wisdom from the previous theoretical literature is that del-
egation and incentive pay are positively related. In Prendergast (2002), two key
elements drive the positive relationship: workers get private benefits from tasks,
and firms can monitor worker effort. Without delegation, firms always monitor
workers because it is a more effective instrument than output based pay to induce
effort. On the other hand, when authority is delegated to a worker, inducing task
selection is also important, and the only way to do this is through output based pay.
This leads to the positive relationship between delegation and incentive pay. In
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), private benefits once again play an important role.
The other important feature in their framework is that some tasks are unproduc-
tive. Strengthening incentives on the productive task (i.e. output) then increases
the opportunity cost of unproductive tasks, leading to a larger set of allowable tasks
for the worker. A number of empirical studies have found support for this theoret-
ical prediction of a positive relationship between delegation and incentive pay (e.g.
DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010), Itoh, Kikutani, and Hayashida (2008), Wulf (2007),
Foss and Laursen (2005), Colombo and Delmastro (2004), Nagar (2002), MacLeod
and Parent (1999)).
We begin by estimating the standard relationship between incentive pay and
authority, neglecting the distinction between complex and simple jobs. Consistent
with previous empirical work, we also find a positive relationship between delegation
and incentive pay. This positive relationship is corroborated in column 1 of Table
2, which reports results from a probit model in which Incentive Pay is the depen-
dent variable and Delegation is the key independent variable, including the controls
defined in Appendix B. The coefficient of Delegation is positive and statistically
significant. As seen at the bottom of column 1, an increase in Delegation from 0 to
1 is associated, on average, with an increase of 0.066 (from 0.169 to 0.236) in the
predicted probability that Incentive Pay = 1.
Column 2 of Table 2 includes the interaction Delegation×Complex in the probit
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model and reveals the main empirical result of the paper. If the coefficient on this
interaction were zero, then the relationship between delegation and incentive pay
would not differ between the “complex” and “simple” jobs (and would be positive as
in the previous literature and our specification in column 1). Instead, this parameter
is negative and estimated with high precision. As seen at the bottom of column 2, an
increase in Delegation from 0 to 1 is associated, on average, with an increase of 0.053
(from 0.172 to 0.225) in the predicted probability that Incentive Pay = 1. However,
this masks a pronounced difference between complex and simple jobs. For complex
jobs, an increase in Delegation from 0 to 1 is associated, on average, with a decrease
of 0.132 (from 0.238 to 0.106) in the predicted probability that Incentive Pay = 1.
In contrast, for simple jobs, an increase in Delegation from 0 to 1 is associated, on
average, with an increase of 0.094 (from 0.157 to 0.251) in the predicted probability
that Incentive Pay = 1.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 are analogous to columns 1 and 2, respectively,
though using our second measure of incentive pay, Incentive Pay(l.o.g.), as the
dependent variable. The results are qualitatively the same in this case, based on
the average incremental effects of Delegation. Finally, columns 5 and 6 of Table
2 are analogous to columns 1 and 2, respectively, but using our third measure of
incentive pay, Incentive Pay(n.m.), as the dependent variable. Again, the results
are qualitatively the same in this case. In summary, across all three measures the
empirical results suggest that the relationship between incentives and delegation is
positive only for simple jobs and that it is negative for complex jobs. 12
A potential omitted variable in our three incentive pay models is the degree of
risk in the production environment. A well-known prediction from agency theory
is that the relationship between these two variables should be negative (Holmstrom
(1979); Shavell (1979)). Recent work suggests that identifying this risk-incentives
tradeoff empirically requires controlling for delegation in models of incentive pay
(Prendergast (2002); DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010)). To account for this tradeoff, we
define the following risk measure from the management survey, following DeVaro
and Kurtulus (2010):
Risk = 1 if the current state of the market for the main product or service of
the establishment is described as “turbulent” (= 0 otherwise)
Table 3 replicates Table 2, including Risk as a control variable in all models.
Our main result concerning a negative relationship between incentives and authority
holds even in the presence of Risk as a control. Furthermore, the Risk coefficient has
the expected sign (negative) and is statistically significant, revealing a risk-incentives
12In unreported sensitivity analyses, we investigated the possibility that our results are being
driven by a particular narrowly-defined occupational group. To explore this possibility, for every
two-digit occupation in our “complex” group, we replicated all analyses for the subsample that
dropped that two-digit occupation. Across all of these tests, our qualitative results were identical
and the quantitative results were similar.
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tradeoff.
It is also interesting to see how the incremental effects of delegation on incentive
pay change when we control for risk in our analysis. To examine this question, we
compare incremental effects of delegation on the variable Incentive Pay between
Tables 2 and 3, restricting our attention to the subsample of tradeable goods and
services (for which our definition of risk applies). For simple jobs, the incremental
effects for delegation is 13.8 percent when risk is not controlled for (in the restricted
version of Table 2) and 14.7 percent when risk is controlled for (in Table 3). Thus
controlling for risk strengthens the positive relationship between delegation and
incentive pay for simple jobs. This finding is consistent with Prendergast (2002) if
we allow for risk aversion in his framework, because firms are more likely to delegate
authority in uncertain settings where the value of a worker’s private information is
higher. This increases the risk premium paid to a worker which in turn leads to
weaker incentive pay when the regression omits a control for risk.
For complex jobs, however, we see the opposite result. The incremental effect of
delegation on Incentive Pay is −9.4 percent when risk is not controlled for (in the
restricted version of Table 2) and −11.0 percent when risk is controlled for (in Table
3). Thus controlling for risk, makes the incremental effect of delegation even more
negative for complex jobs, which is unexpected in light of Prendergast (2002). The
key difference is that whereas the theory in Prendergast (2002) predicts a positive
relationship between risk and delegation of authority, the empirical relationship is
actually negative for complex jobs. One interpretation for this negative relationship
is that in complex jobs a worker’s private information might arise from specialized
skills that he has acquired from doing his work rather than from knowing market
conditions better. For example, authority is delegated to a cardiac surgeon based on
his superior knowledge in evaluating patient characteristics rather than his knowl-
edge of market conditions.
To get a feel for which jobs within the “complex” category might be driving
our results, we replicated the analysis in Table 2, but dropping professionals from
the analysis so that Complex includes only those in science and technology. The
coefficients of Delegation×Complex for our three incentive measures along with the
t statistics in parentheses are as follows: -1.244 (2.15) for the variable Incentive Pay,
-1.714 (3.15) for the variable Incentive Pay(l.o.g.), and -1.976 (2.77) for the variable
Incentive Pay (n.m.). Thus, when we only consider science and technology in the
complex category, our coefficients of interest are negative and statistically significant
at conventional levels for all three incentive measures.
Next, we replicated the analysis in Table 2, but dropping the category Science
and Technology from the analysis so that Complex includes only professionals. The
coefficients of Delegation×Complex for our three incentive measures along with the
t statistics in parentheses are as follows: -0.916 (2.11) for the variable Incentive Pay,
-0.440 (0.96) for the variable Incentive Pay(l.o.g.), and -1.000 (2.06) for the variable
Incentive Pay (n.m.). Thus, when we only consider professionals in the complex
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category, our coefficients of interest are negative for all three incentive measures
and statistically significant at conventional levels for two of them.
A potential concern is that the occupations that comprise the core of the analysis
might be highly correlated with industry, which could have the following implica-
tion. Since our three basic empirical models omit interactions between the industry
dummies and the delegation variable, it may be that the coefficient of Delegation ×
Complex in these models is only reflecting the effects of these omitted interactions.
In exploring this possibility, we found that within the category of “Complex”, it
is true that there is a fair amount of overlap between the industry categories and
the “largest occupational group” categories. To isolate which individual industry-
delegation interactions (if any) might be driving our main result, we experimented
with adding different configurations of these interactions as controls in our empiri-
cal models. For two of our three dependent variables (Incentive Pay and Incentive
Pay (n.m.)) we found that our main result is robust to the inclusion of any such
configuration. In the Incentive Pay model that includes all industry-delegation in-
teractions, the coefficient of Delegation is 0.724 with a t-statistic of 2.25, and the
coefficient of Delegation × Complex is -0.753 with a t-statistic of 1.66. Similarly,
if the full set of interactions are included in the Incentive Pay (n.m.) model, the
coefficient of Delegation is 0.390 with a t-statistic of 1.37, and the coefficient of
Delegation × Complex is -1.156 with a t-statistic of 2.55.
For the model in which the dependent variable is Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) we found
that our main result is sensitive to the inclusion of the interaction of delegation
and the “Other Business Services” industry. This particular industry accounts for
ten percent of sample and twenty percent of the subsample of “complex” jobs. In
any configuration of industry-delegation controls that includes this particular inter-
action, the coefficient of Delegation × Complex becomes statistically insignificant,
whereas in any configuration that omits this particular interaction our main result
continues to hold. For example, in the model that includes all industry-delegation
interactions except that for “other business services”, the coefficient of Delegation
is 0.735 with a t-statistic of 2.50, and the coefficient of Delegation × Complex is
-0.846 with a t-statistic of 1.86. The fact that our main result is sensitive to industry-
delegation controls (for the case of “other business services”) for one of our three
dependent variables suggests that industry, as well as occupation, may play an im-
portant role in moderating the relationship between delegation and incentive pay
and that future theoretical work aimed at elucidating the role of industry would be
valuable. The fact that industry matters is not surprising given that the nature of
work is known to vary across industries, as demonstrated by Neal (1995) and others,
and our basic argument is fundamentally about the nature of work, which is related
both to occupation and to industries.
To summarize, our key empirical finding is that the positive relationship between
incentives and delegation that has been reported in the empirical literature masks a
stark difference between jobs. We find that for simple jobs, the relationship between
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delegation and incentives is positive, as has been found in the previous literature.
For complex jobs, in contrast to the previous literature, we find that the relationship
between delegation and incentive pay is negative.
As a final point before turning to the theory, given that DeVaro and Kurtulus
(2010) found support for a positive relationship between risk and authority without
distinguishing across occupations, it is interesting to consider this relationship while
discriminating between complex and simple jobs. To do so, we estimated an ordered
probit model in which the dependent variable was the four-valued authority measure.
The independent variable, Risk, had a positive and significant coefficient. The
incremental effect of Risk on the probability that the authority measure has the
highest outcome was 0.096 in the model that omits the dummy variable for “complex
versus simple jobs” and its interaction with Risk. In the model that includes these
variables, the coefficient of Risk remained positive and significant (t = 2.48), and the
coefficient of the interaction was negative with t = -1.51. The incremental effect just
mentioned became 0.102 in this model; when the incremental effect was decomposed
into complex jobs and simple jobs, it became -0.047 for complex jobs and 0.140 for
simple jobs.
3 Model
The objective of this section is to provide a theoretical explanation for the negative
relationship between delegation and incentive pay when jobs are complex. In our
model, we abstract from private benefits of workers (which is a key element in
previous theoretical work), and instead focus on two key features that we believe
are central to our example on cardiac surgeons: a positive risk-return tradeoff across
tasks and the inability to contract separately on tasks. Later in this section, we adapt
our framework and show how the existence of private benefits leads to a positive
relationship between delegation and incentive pay, and compare our findings to
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Prendergast (2002).
Our model consists of a principal (the employer) and an agent (the worker). The
model has four main parts: a description of how the agent can influence output, the
preferences of the principal and agent, contracting assumptions, and the timing of
the game along with the information that the players have at various stages of the
game.
First consider how an agent can influence output. There are two tasks: a low
risk-return task, L, with a return normalized to 0 and a high risk-return task, H,
where returns, given by R, are normally distributed. The mean of R is given by
−
R(ξ) > 0 where ξ ≥ 0 is a parameter. The variance of R is given by α > 0. Thus
there is a positive risk-return tradeoff across task L and task H.
Output, given by y, consists of two additively separable components. The first
component is the return on tasks described above, and the second component is the
output from effort, which is given by a+ a, where a is the agent’s effort and a is a
13
normally distributed variable with mean 0 and variance σ2a > 0. The parameter σ
2
a
is the noise with which output measures effort. Thus
y =
{
a+ a if task L is selected
a+ a +R if task H is selected
We also impose the following restrictions on the function
−
R.
Assumption 1. The function
−
R satisfies the following properties.
1.
−
R is continuous and strictly increasing in ξ.
2. There exists some ξ so that
−
R(ξ) =
1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
.
3. The function
−
R(ξ) is bounded above by
1
2c
.
The first part of Assumption 1 says that expected returns across tasks get larger
as the parameter ξ increases. The second part of Assumption 1 says that for ξ
sufficiently high, returns on task H exceed the maximum possible (second best)
surplus from effort. This part ensures that the principal prefers to induce task H
when ξ is sufficiently large. The third part of Assumption 1 says that returns on
task H do not exceed the efficient (first best) surplus that can be generated from
effort. This part ensures that there is some conflict of interest between the principal
and agent over task selection.
Next consider preferences. The principal is risk neutral. The agent’s utility
function is of the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) form and is given by
U(w, a) = −e−η(w− ca
2
2
)
where η > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, w denotes wages and ca
2
2
is the agent’s effort cost function, with c > 0.
Next consider contracts. We assume that contracts can only be written on
output, y. That is, the individual components of y (effort and tasks) cannot be
contracted on. As in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Prendergast (2002), we
restrict our attention to linear contracts, both for tractability and to allow for a clear
interpretation of the strength of incentives based on the contract slope.13 Thus, we
assume w = t+ sy, where t is a fixed transfer from the principal to the agent, and s
is the slope of the contract, with s ≤ 1. Incentives are said to be stronger when s is
13Our empirical work focuses on non-managerial worker groups. The assumption of linear con-
tracts is more reasonable for such workers than for executives, whose incentive compensation plans
are comprised more heavily of nonlinear components (e.g. stock options).
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higher. Because of the CARA-Normal framework, we can write the agent’s certainty
equivalent, denoted by CE, as follows:
CE =

t+ sa− ca
2
2
− ηs
2σ2a
2
if task L is selected
t+ sa+ s
−
R(ξ)− ca
2
2
− ηs
2(σ2a + α)
2
if task H is selected
Finally, the timing and information structure are as follows. The principal offers
a contract to the agent that specifies t and s and whether authority is delegated to
the agent or not. If the principal retains authority, we assume that he can commit
to selecting either task L or H. The agent then decides whether to participate. If he
does participate, he can distinguish task L from task H at no cost. The principal,
however, has to pay an information cost C > 0 to distinguish between tasks. We
assume that the principal can select tasks only if he pays the cost C.14 Tasks are
then selected by the party that has authority, and the agent exerts effort. Finally,
output is realized and wages paid.
To illustrate how incentives vary with authority, we consider the following two
optimization problems. The first considers a setting in which the principal chooses
tasks. This is called the “no delegation” problem, and the subscript used for vari-
ables in this problem is n. In the second problem, the principal delegates authority
to an agent to select tasks. The subscript used for variables in this problem is d.
In the “no delegation” problem the principal incurs a cost of C to differentiate
tasks based on their risk-return attributes.
The principal’s problem is
Max
an,xn∈{L,H},sn∈[0,1],tn
E[y − w]− C
subject to the incentive compatibility condition associated with effort
an =
sn
c
(ICan)
and subject to the agent’s participation constraint
CE ≥ w0 (IRn)
where w0 is the agent’s reservation wage.
In the delegation problem, the agent decides the task, and the optimization
problem is
14This assumption says that the principal cannot select a task randomly when he does not bear
the cost C. One way to interpret this assumption is that the cost C does not merely provide
information about tasks but also gives the principal access to those tasks. An alternative way to
ensure that the principal never chooses tasks when he is not informed is to assume a third task
with extremely low payoffs to the principal.
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Max
ad,xd∈{L,H},sd∈[0,1],td
E[y − w]
subject to the incentive compatibility condition associated with effort
ad =
sd
c
(ICad)
the incentive compatibility condition with respect to task selection
xd ∈ argmax CE (ICxd)
and the agent’s participation constraint
CE ≥ w0 (IRd)
There are two features that distinguish the no-delegation problem from the del-
egation one. First, the fixed cost, C, appears only in the no-delegation problem.
Second, the delegation problem has an additional incentive compatibility condition
with respect to task selection. That is, the principal must induce both effort and
task selection when he delegates authority to an agent.
Henceforth, let s∗n and x∗n denote the optimal levels of incentives and task choice
for the no-delegation problem, and let s∗d and x
∗
d denote the optimal levels of in-
centives and task choice for the delegation problem. The objective of the following
analysis is to compare the optimal level of incentives across both of these problems
(i.e. to compare s∗n with s∗d). Also note that since the individual rationality con-
straint and the incentive compatibility constraint with respect to effort are common
to both the “delegation” and “no delegation” problems, we sometimes drop the
subscripts, n and d, and refer to these constraints as (IR) and (ICa).
To see how a conflict of interest with respect to tasks arises in the delegation
problem, substitute the agent’s individual rationality constraint into the principal’s
expected profit function. Then, given an incentive level s, the principal prefers task
H if and only if
−
R(ξ) − ηs
2α
2
≥ 0, whereas the agent prefers task H if and only if
s
−
R(ξ) − ηs
2α
2
≥ 0. Because s ≤ 1, the agent places less weight than the principal
on task returns relative to risk and is thus likely to pick task L even though the
principal prefers task H. To correct this conflict, incentives must be reduced.15 This
creates a tension between inducing effort and higher return tasks when the agent is
delegated authority.
15When s > 0 the agent finds task H at least as good as task L if and only if
−
R(ξ) − ηsα
2
≥ 0.
Notice that
−
R(ξ)− ηsα
2
is decreasing in s.
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Before solving for the optimal contract, it is useful to define a cutoff level of risk,
αd, associated with task H, where αd ≡
2
−
R(ξ)
η
(1 + ηcσ2a)
(1− 2
−
R(ξ))
. Above this cutoff level,
a conflict of interests arises between the principal who wants to induce task H and
an agent who prefers to select task L instead.
A job is characterized by the vector, (ξ, α, σ2a). Given the cutoff αd, we define a
complex job in the following way.
Definition 1. A job is complex if ξ ≥
−
R
−1
(
1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
) and α > αd.
The definition says that a job is complex if tasks vary sufficiently in terms of
their expected return (ξ is sufficiently large), if output is a very noisy measure of
effort (σ2a is sufficiently large) and if the variation in risk across tasks given by α is
strictly above a critical threshold αd so that preferences between the principal and
agent diverge with respect to task selection.16 As we mentioned at the start of our
model, our main focus is to understand how delegation and incentive pay can have
a negative relationship for these complex jobs.
To solve the model, start by defining sL =
1
1 + ηcσ2a
and sH =
1
1 + ηc(σ2a + α)
.
Note that sL corresponds to the principal’s optimal solution in the “no delegation”
problem if the task is fixed at L. Likewise sH corresponds to the principal’s optimal
solution in the “no delegation” problem if the task is fixed at H.
We now state the two main propositions of the paper. The proofs of the propo-
sitions are in Appendix C. The first proposition compares incentive levels across the
“no delegation” and “delegation” problems. The second proposition states condi-
tions under which authority is delegated to an agent. We say that the relationship
between delegation and incentives is negative if s∗d < s
∗
n.
Proposition 1. Consider a complex job. Then
x∗n = x
∗
d = H
and
s∗d =
2
−
R(ξ)
ηα
< sH = s
∗
n
Proposition 1 says that the relationship between delegation and incentive pay
is negative for complex jobs. The intuition for the result is as follows. Because
the return across tasks,
−
R(ξ) exceeds the expected profit from inducing task L, the
16An alternative way to think of complexity is that α is strongly positively correlated to ξ and
σ2a. To see this, suppose α = k1ξ + k2σ
2
a. Then when ξ and σ
2
a are large enough and when k1 and
k2 sufficiently large and positive, then a job is complex
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ααd
Figure 1: Negative relationship between delegation and incentives for complex jobs.
principal always prefers to induce task H. When α ≤ αd, there is no conflict of
interests and the agent selects task H when the incentive level is sH . However,
when α > αd, the agent’s preferences diverge and the agent prefers task L. To
get the risk averse agent to select task H, incentives have to be weakened, leading
to a negative relationship between delegation and incentives. Note that as α gets
sufficiently large, both s∗d and s
∗
n approach 0, but the negative relationship still holds.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between delegation and incentives for complex jobs.
We now provide a brief discussion (without a formal proof) about the relationship
between delegation and incentive pay for jobs that are not complex.17 There are
two remaining cases to consider. In Case 1, α ≤ αd. For this case, the difference in
the risk premium across tasks is low, so there is no conflict of interests with respect
to task selection and s∗d = s
∗
n. In Case 2, ξ <
−
R
−1
(
1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
) and α > αd.
For this case, there is a non-monotonicity in the relationship between delegation
and incentive pay. For levels of α just above αd the relationship is negative. For
intermediate levels of α, the relationship switches to positive. This is because though
the principal prefers task H in the no-delegation problem, inducing this task in
the delegation problem distorts effort too much. Thus the principal induces task
L instead when he delegates authority. Finally, for α very large, preferences are
once again aligned between the principal and agent (they both prefer task L) and
incentive levels are the same across both the delegation and no-delegation problems.
Proposition 1 characterizes the tasks selected and the incentive levels across
17In a previous working paper version we have formal proofs for all of these claims (DeVaro and
Prasad (2011)).
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both the delegation and no-delegation problems. It does not tell us when authority
is delegated to an agent. The next proposition describes conditions under which
authority is delegated to an agent for the case of complex jobs. Define
−
C(ξ, α, σ2a)
as the critical level of the information cost above which authority is delegated to an
agent for a job. A lower
−
C indicates that the principal is more likely to delegate
authority, and when
−
C = 0, the principal always delegates authority to the agent.
Proposition 2. Consider complex jobs. Then
1.
−
C(ξ, α, σ2a) = (sH − s∗d)(
1
c
− sH + s
∗
d
2
− η(σ
2
a + α)(sH + s
∗
d)
2
) > 0.
2.
−
C(ξ′, α, σ2a) <
−
C(ξ, α, σ2a) whenever ξ
′ > ξ.
3.
−
C(ξ, α, σ2a
′
) <
−
C(ξ, α, σ2a) whenever σ
2
a
′
> σ2a.
The first part of Proposition 2 characterizes the critical level of information cost
above which authority is delegated. The last two parts say that for complex jobs,
the principal is more likely to delegate authority when the expected return on task
H is high and when effort is noisier to measure.18 When the expected return on task
H is high the interests of the principal and agent are more closely aligned (i.e both
place more weight on task returns relative to risk). Thus, incentives do not have
to be weakened as much to get the agent to choose task H. This in turn leads to
lower distortions in effort in the delegation problem, which makes delegation more
likely. Next, consider what happens when effort gets noisier to measure. In this case,
inducing effort is more costly because of the risk premium that has to be paid to the
agent. This reduces incentives across both problems (in the limit, as the noise gets
very large, incentives go to 0). Once again, distortions in effort in the delegation
problem are not large relative to the no-delegation problem, and the principal is
more likely to delegate authority.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we can examine the relationship between del-
egation and incentives as we change three key parameters: C, ξ, and σ2a. First
consider the information cost C. Because C is a fixed cost which does not affect
optimal incentive levels in either problem, delegation is more likely as C increases.
18The relationship between
−
C and α is non-monotonic.
−
C weakly increases in α till a certain
threshold level of α beyond which it strictly decreases in α. The intuition for the result is that
for low levels of α, the principal’s and the agent’s interests are more closely aligned (i.e both place
less weight on task risk relative to returns). Thus incentives do not have to be weakened as much
to induce the agent to select the higher return task. This leads to lower distortions in effort for
the delegation problem, which makes delegation more likely. As α gets sufficiently high, there are
conflicts of interest between the principal and agent. But because the high return task is very risky,
the levels of s∗d and s
∗
n are very low, and thus distortions in effort for the delegation problem are
small. Once again the principal is more likely to delegate.
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From Proposition 1, we know that delegation and incentives must have a negative
relationship. Next, consider the parameter ξ. Start with a value of ξ where the
principal prefers not to delegate, and consider an increase in ξ. From Proposition
2 we know that delegation is more likely. Furthermore, because sH does not vary
with ξ, and because s∗d < sH , we know that incentives must be lower if authority is
delegated. A similar argument can be applied to the parameter σ2a.
It is useful at this stage to compare our model with Prendergast (2002). As
mentioned earlier, we abstract from private benefits, which is a central feature in
his paper. We modify our model to study private benefits in the subsection that fol-
lows. A second critical difference which drives the positive relationship in his paper
is that the principal can monitor the agent’s effort. This provides the principal with
an effective instrument to target only effort. Thus when authority is not delegated
to an agent, the principal always monitors effort. On the other hand, when authority
is delegated to the agent, the principal offers an output based contract, so that the
agent focuses more on task returns rather than his private benefits (which Prender-
gast assumes are small). This is how the positive relationship between delegation
and incentive pay arises in his framework. In an extension, Prendergast (2002) does
consider a case where the performance measure upon which the agent is rewarded
is not aligned with output that the principal cares about. He also assumes that this
misalignment between the performance measure and output can be correlated with
noise with which output measures effort (which resembles our definition of complex
jobs). But even for this case, because of the ability of firms to monitor workers,
delegation and incentive pay are positively related.
To summarize, there are three channels through which the negative relationship
between delegation and incentive pay in Table 2 can arise for complex jobs. First,
it could be that complex jobs vary in terms of the information cost
−
C (with all
other parameters held fixed). In this case delegation is more likely for jobs where
the information cost is high, and this leads to the negative relationship between
delegation and incentive pay. Second, it could be that complex jobs vary in terms
of the noise with which output is a measure of effort, σ2a (with all other parameters
held fixed). Delegation is more likely as σ2a is higher (because distortions in effort
are smaller) and incentive pay is lower because of the higher risk premium that has
to be paid to the agent, again leading to a negative relationship. Finally, it could
be that complex jobs vary in terms of the expected return across tasks, ξ (with
all other parameters held fixed). Delegation is more likely as ξ is higher (because
there is less of a conflict of interests with respect to task selection) and incentive
pay is lowered to get the agent to choose task H. This again leads to a negative
relationship between delegation and incentive pay.
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3.1 Private Benefits
The main objective of our model was to find sufficient conditions for delegation and
incentives to have a negative relationship. Our result is different from other mod-
els in the literature (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Prendergast (2002))
that have yielded a positive relationship between these variables when an agent has
private benefits across tasks. In this subsection, we abstract from the risk-return
tradeoff across tasks and instead focus on agents having private benefits, which al-
lows us to compare our results with previous theoretical work. Our key contribution
in this section is to show that the positive relationship between delegation and in-
centives still holds even if firms cannot monitor workers (as in Prendergast (2002))
and even if there are no unproductive tasks (as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)).
To incorporate private benefits, we make two changes to our model. First, we
assume that α = 0 so that tasks do not vary by risk. Second, we assume that the
agent has private benefits across tasks. The private benefit from task L to the agent
is given by BL > 0, and the private benefit from task H to the agent is given by
BH > 0. The following proposition says that when agents have private benefits,
delegation and incentives must be positively related.
Proposition 3. In the case where agents have private benefits, s∗d ≥ s∗n.
To see why a conflict of interests arises between the principal and agent with
respect to task selection, substitute the agent’s individual rationality constraint
into the principal’s expected profit function. Then, given an incentive level s, the
principal prefers task H if and only if
−
R(ξ) + BH ≥ BL, whereas the agent prefers
task H if and only if s
−
R(ξ) +BH ≥ BL. Because s ≤ 1, the agent places less weight
than the principal on task returns relative to his private benefits and is thus likely
to choose task L even though the principal prefers task H. But in contrast to the
previous case where tasks have a positive risk-return tradeoff, incentives must be
increased for this conflict to be reduced. This is how private benefits from tasks lead
to a positive relationship between delegation and incentives. In fact, as we show in
the proof of Proposition 3, when
BL −BH
−
R(ξ)
is strictly greater than but sufficiently
close to
1
1 + ηcσ2a
, the inequality in Proposition 3 is strict.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we document a new empirical finding on the relationship between
delegation and incentives. Using data from a large cross section of British estab-
lishments, we show that the positive relationship between incentives and delegation
that has been consistently documented in the empirical literature masks a stark
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difference between job types; for simple jobs the relationship is positive, whereas
for complex jobs it is negative. We also construct a theoretical model offering a
potential explanation for the negative relationship between delegation and incentive
pay for complex jobs. In our model there is one performance measure which per-
forms multiple functions: inducing task selection when authority is delegated and
inducing effort. Inducing task selection requires weaker incentives, whereas induc-
ing effort requires stronger incentives. We find that when returns on tasks vary a
lot, and when effort is noisy to measure, delegation and incentives are negatively
related. We believe that both of these features characterize a number of occupations
involving complex jobs.
Our empirical and theoretical analysis shows that the relationship between an
employer’s decisions about incentive pay and delegation is more nuanced than has
been appreciated in the previous literature. While we see the new stylized fact
we present as striking, particularly given the breadth of the sample on which it
is based, we caution that it is based on an empirical distinction between complex
jobs and simple jobs that is (necessarily) arbitrary. The result should therefore be
subjected to further scrutiny in future work using other datasets. In particular,
narrowing the focus to particular occupations might offer opportunities for sharper
distinctions between complex jobs and simple jobs and would also eliminate some
of the unobservables that may be inadequately controlled for in our analysis. As
noted earlier, the previous literature contains some evidence from studies based on
particular occupations, e.g. Nagar (2002) and Wulf (2007). Both of those studies
consider managers, as opposed to our analysis which focuses on non-managers (two
of our three incentive measures are for non-managers), so we see our study and
theirs as complementary. It is interesting to note that their studies of managers find
a positive relationship between incentives and delegation. Although we do think of
management as a complex job, we think there may be other factors at play that
drive the positive relationship. In particular, there is a hierarchical aspect to man-
agement that could play an important role in the relationship between delegation
and incentive pay (see Rosen (1982)). In fact, Wulf (2007) uses hierarchy itself as
indirect measure of authority. Private benefits from empire building (Avery, Cheva-
lier, and Schaefer (1998)) and from taking decisions to benefit a division (Rajan,
Servaes, and Zingales (2000)) could also be driving the positive relationship. We
believe a promising direction for future work would be to investigate the role of pri-
vate benefits versus risk-return tradeoffs across individual occupations to see which
effect dominates.
We conclude with two points. First, in addition to contributing to the academic
literature, our main result has important managerial implications in that we show
why the conventional wisdom (i.e. delegation of authority should go hand in hand
with incentive pay) may not hold for a certain important class of jobs. The lesson
for managers is not just that the optimal incentive pay and delegation decisions
depend crucially on job characteristics. The analysis goes further in illuminating
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which job characteristics matter and why, and our theoretical result is supported by
empirical evidence from a large cross section of employers. Second, we note that our
theoretical framework is tractable and could be extended in a number of interesting
directions. One particularly fruitful direction might be to allow for endogenous job
assignments in a setting with multiple agents as opposed to just one. Some workers
would be assigned to complex jobs and others to simple jobs. This allocation of
workers to jobs could be expected to reduce the incentive tradeoff between task
selection and effort, though it would result in a higher wage bill. We leave this topic
to future research.
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Appendix A
Panel 1: Two-digit and three-digit SOC codes for Complex Jobs
CODE DESCRIPTION
20 NATURAL SCIENTISTS
200 Chemists
201 Biological scientists & biochemists
202 Physicists, geologists & meteorologists
209 Other natural scientists nes
21 ENGINEERS AND TECHNOLOGISTS
210 Civil, structural, municipal, mining & quarry engineers
211 Mechanical engineers
212 Electrical engineers
213 Electronic engineers
214 Software engineers
215 Chemical engineers
216 Design & development engineers
217 Process & production engineers
218 Planning & quality control engineers
219 Other engineers & technologists nes
22 HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
220 Medical practitioners
221 Pharmacists/pharmacologists
222 Ophthalmic opticians
223 Dental practitioners
224 Veterinarians
23 TEACHING PROFESSIONALS
230 University & polytechnic teaching professionals
231 Higher & further education teaching professionals
232 Education officers, school inspectors
233 Secondary (& middle school deemed secondary)
education teaching professionals
234 Primary (& middle school deemed primary) &
nursery education teaching professionals
235 Special education teaching professionals
239 Other teaching professionals nes
24 LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
240 Judges & officers of the court
241 Barristers & advocates
242 Solicitors
25 BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS
250 Chartered & certified accountants
24
CODE DESCRIPTION
251 Management accountants
252 Actuaries, economists & statisticians
253 Management consultants, business analysts
26 ARCHITECTS, TOWN PLANNERS AND SURVEYORS
260 Architects
261 Town planners
262 Building, land, mining & general practice surveyors
27 LIBRARIANS AND RELATED PROFESSIONALS
270 Librarians
271 Archivists & curators
29 PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATIONS NEC
290 Psychologists
291 Other social & behavioural scientists
292 Clergy
293 Social workers, probation officers
30 SCIENTIFIC TECHNICIANS
300 Laboratory technicians
301 Engineering technicians
302 Electrical/electronic technicians
303 Architectural & town planning technicians
304 Building & civil engineering technicians
309 Other scientific technicians nes
31 DRAUGHTS PERSONS, QUANTITY AND OTHER SURVEYORS
310 Draughts persons
311 Building inspectors
312 Quantity surveyors
313 Marine, insurance & other surveyors
32 COMPUTER ANALYSTS/PROGRAMMERS
320 Computer analyst/programmers
33 SHIP AND AIRCRAFT OFFICERS, AIR TRAFFIC PLANNERS
AND CONTROLLERS
330 Air traffic planners & controllers
331 Aircraft flight deck officers
332 Ship & hovercraft officers
34 HEALTH ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
340 Nurses
341 Midwives
342 Medical radiographers
343 Physiotherapists
344 Chiropodists
345 Dispensing opticians
25
CODE DESCRIPTION
346 Medical technicians, dental auxiliaries
347 Occupational & speech therapists, psychotherapists, therapists nes
348 Environmental health officers
349 Other health associate professionals nes
35 LEGAL ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
350 Legal service & related occupations
360 Estimators, valuers
36 BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
361 Underwriters, claims assessors, brokers, investment analysts
362 Taxation experts
363 Personnel & industrial relations officers
364 Organisation & methods & work study officers
37 SOCIAL WELFARE ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
370 Matrons, houseparents
371 Welfare, community & youth workers
38 LITERARY, ARTISTIC AND SPORTS PROFESSIONALS
380 Authors, writers, journalists
381 Artists, commercial artists, graphic designers
382 Industrial designers
383 Clothing designers
384 Actors, entertainers, stage managers, producers & directors
385 Musicians
386 Photographers, camera, sound & video operators
387 Professional athletes, sports officials
39 ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL OCCUPATIONS
390 Information officers
391 Vocational & industrial trainers
392 Careers advisers & vocational guidance specialists
393 Driving instructors (excluding HGV)
394 Inspectors of factories, utilities & trading standards
395 Other statutory & similar inspectors nes
396 Occupational hygienists & safety officers (health & safety)
399 Other associate professional & technical occupations nes
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Panel 2: One-digit SOC codes for Simple Jobs
CODE DESCRIPTION
4 ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECRETARIAL OCCUPATIONS
5 SKILLED TRADES OCCUPATIONS
6 PERSONAL SERVICE OCCUPATIONS
7 SALES AND CUSTOMER SERVICE OCCUPATIONS
8 PROCESS PLANT AND MACHINE OPERATIVES
9 ELEMENTARY OCCUPATIONS
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Appendix B
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS USED AS CONTROL VARIABLES:
Single-Establishment Firm = 1 if the establishment is either a single independent
establishment not belonging to another body, or the sole UK establishment of a
foreign organization
= 0 if the establishment is one of a number of different establishments within a
larger organization
Establishment Size = total number of full time, part time, and temporary workers
at the establishment (measured in thousands)
Fraction of Part Time Workers = number of part time workers at the establishment
as a fraction of establishment size
Temporary Workers = 1 if there are temporary agency employees working at the
establishment at the time of the survey
= 0 otherwise
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year = 1 if there are employees who are working
on a temporary basis or have fixed-term contracts for less than one year
= 0 otherwise
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year = 1 if there are employees who have fixed term
contracts for one year or more
= 0 otherwise
Number of Recognized Unions = Total number of recognized unions at the workplace
Main Activity of Establishment = 1 if the main activity of the establishment is to
produce goods or services for consumers = 0 for any of the following other possibil-
ities: supplier of goods or services to other companies; supplier of goods or services
to other parts of the organization to which it belongs; do not produce goods or
provide services for sale in the open market; an administrative office only
Single Product = 1 if the establishment is concentrated on one product or service
= 0 if it is concentrated on several different products or services
Private Sector Franchise = 1 if the establishment is a private sector company and
a franchise
= 0 otherwise
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Private Sector Non-franchise = 1 if the establishment is a private sector company
but not a franchise
= 0 otherwise
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise = 1 if the establishment is a publicly-
traded private sector unit and a franchise
= 0 otherwise
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise = 1 if the establishment is a publicly-
traded private sector unit but not a franchise
= 0 otherwise
Operation Over Five Years = 1 if the workplace has been operating at its present
address for 5 years or more
= 0 otherwise
Industry Controls: (Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas, and Water; Construction;
Wholesale and Retail; Hotels and Restaurants; Transport and Communication;
Financial Services; Other Business Services; Public Administration; Education;
Health; Other Community Services)
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Error
Complex 0.176 0.016
Incentive Pay 0.141 0.016
Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) 0.082 0.012
Incentive Pay(n.m.) 0.108 0.014
Delegation 0.294 0.021
Risk 0.206 0.022
Largest Occupational Group:
Professional Occupations 0.125 0.014
Technical and Scientific Occupations 0.051 0.010
Clerical and Secretarial Occupations 0.168 0.017
Craft and Skilled Service Occupations 0.118 0.016
Personal and Protective Service Occupations 0.203 0.018
Sales Occupations 0.140 0.017
Plant and Machine Operatives 0.096 0.013
Other Occupations 0.099 0.013
Industry:
Manufacturing 0.129 0.017
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.002 0.000
Construction 0.039 0.008
Wholesale and Retail 0.196 0.019
Hotels and Restaurants 0.066 0.011
Transport and Communication 0.044 0.009
Financial Services 0.031 0.006
Other Business Services 0.104 0.014
Public Administration 0.049 0.009
Education 0.142 0.016
Health 0.147 0.016
Other Community Services 0.050 0.009
Firm Characteristics:
Single-Establishment Firm 0.326 0.022
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year 0.170 0.016
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.253 0.018
Operation Over Five Years 0.898 0.013
Main Activity of Establishment 0.537 0.023
Temporary Workers 0.190 0.016
Establishment Size 0.060 0.003
Fraction of Part Time Workers 0.328 0.014
Number of Recognized Unions 0.886 0.055
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Non-franchise 0.009 0.003
Private Sector Publicly-Traded Franchise 0.273 0.019
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Private Sector Non-franchise 0.024 0.008
Private Sector Franchise 0.430 0.023
Sample Size = 1766
Note: Tabulations are for the 1766 establishments for which data on Incentive Pay, Complex, and
Delegation are non-missing, excluding those observations for which the largest occupational group
is Managers and Administrators. However, some of the above statistics are based on smaller
sample sizes due to missing values in individual variables. Establishment Size is measured in
thousands. All statistics are establishment weighted.
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TABLE 2: Probit Results.
Dependent Variable
Incentive Pay Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) Incentive Pay(n.m.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent
Variables:
Delegation 0.285* 0.406** 0.529*** 0.601*** 0.212 0.367 **
(0.160) (0.169) (0.192) (0.203) (0.179) (0.183)
Delegation x Complex -1.057*** -0.882** -1.250***
(0.351) (0.431) (0.395)
Complex 0.357 0.187 0.219
(0.273) (0.294) (0.303)
Industry Controls
Manufacturing -0.918*** -0.914*** -0.666* -0.667* -0.344 -0.381
(0.308) (0.300) (0.392) (0.391) (0.353) (0.343)
Electricity, Gas -0.872*** -0.870*** -0.705* -0.709** -0.090 -0.052
and Water (0.313) (0.300) (0.363) (0.358) (0.364) (0.325)
Construction -0.812** -0.827** -0.911*** -0.926*** -0.579* -0.625**
(0.373) (0.368) (0.318) (0.319) (0.297) (0.288)
Hotels and -0.631* -0.632* -1.909*** -1.920*** -0.826*** -0.845***
Restaurants (0.356) (0.361) (0.348) (0.346) (0.308) (0.307)
Transport and -1.115*** -1.101*** -1.436*** -1.422*** -0.619* -0.633*
Communication (0.288) (0.288) (0.346) (0.348) (0.350) (0.348)
Financial Services 0.348 0.417 0.593* 0.636* 0.893*** 0.959***
(0.314) (0.310) (0.339) (0.342) (0.333) (0.321)
Other Business -0.373 -0.393 -0.576** -0.558* 0.296 0.298
Services (0.280) (0.296) (0.291) (0.304) (0.302) (0.310)
Public -0.695* -0.734* -0.789* -0.818** 0.617** 0.603**
Administration (0.411) (0.410) (0.407) (0.403) (0.252) (0.273)
Education -1.624*** -1.786*** -3.072*** -3.129***
(0.578) (0.530) (0.453) (0.444)
Health -1.719*** -1.755*** -2.885*** -2.842***
(0.282) (0.280) (0.416) (0.404)
Other Community -1.078*** -1.076*** -1.118*** -1.113*** -0.164 -0.152
Services (0.314) (0.314) (0.381) (0.381) (0.285) (0.289)
Constant -0.900* -0.721 -1.116** -1.152** -2.020*** -2.041***
(0.469) (0.475) (0.501) (0.517) (0.362) (0.386)
Incremental Effect
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of Delegation
Overall (All Jobs) 0.066 0.053 0.083 0.077 0.041 0.034
Complex Jobs -0.132 -0.036 -0.117
Simple Jobs 0.094 0.095 0.072
Sample Size 1719 1719 1719 1719 1639 1639
Note 1: Results are probit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses below each
estimate. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, is denoted by *, **,
and ***, using two-tailed tests. Reference group for industry dummies is Wholesale and Retail.
Note 2: The overall incremental effect of Delegation (for all jobs) is the average value over all
sample observations of the predicted values of
Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) = 1 | Delegation = 1)−Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) = 1 | Delegation = 0)
evaluating Complex at its observed value for each observation. The incremental effect of
Delegation for “Complex” jobs is the average value over all sample observations of the predicted
values of Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g) = 1 | Complex = 1 and Delegation =
1)− Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g) = 1 | Complex = 1 and Delegation = 0). The incremental effect of
Delegation for “Simple” is the average value over all sample observations of
Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g) = 1 | Complex = 0 and Delegation = 1)− Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g) =
1 | Complex = 0 and Delegation = 0).
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TABLE 3: Probit Results Adding Risk as a Control.
Dependent Variable
Incentive Pay Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) Incentive Pay(n.m.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent
Variables:
Delegation 0.565*** 0.685*** 0.734*** 0.803*** 0.419** 0.575 ***
(0.191) (0.200) (0.209) (0.224) (0.206) (0.205)
Delegation x Complex -1.253** -0.894 -1.357***
(0.535) (0.552) (0.483)
Complex 0.466 0.209 0.270
(0.393) (0.368) (0.373)
Risk -0.367 -0.416* -0.713*** - 0.733*** -0.422 -0.443*
(0.238) (0.226) (0.246) (0.248) (0.273) (0.244)
Industry Controls
Manufacturing -1.002*** -0.996*** -0.675* -0.684* -0.428 -0.479
(0.316) (0.307) (0.387) (0.386) (0.363) (0.356)
Electricity, Gas -1.341*** -1.268*** -1.030** -0.993** -0.391 -0.287
and Water (0.424) (0.404) (0.471) (0.465) (0.407) (0.383)
Construction -0.889** -0.893** -0.707** -0.720** -0.622* -0.674*
(0.432) (0.423) (0.353) (0.352) (0.363) (0.349)
Hotels and -0.801** -0.812** -2.077*** -2.101*** -1.023*** -1.066***
Restaurants (0.356) (0.368) (0.357) (0.358) (0.337) (0.340)
Transport and -1.283*** -1.261*** -1.443*** -1.423*** -0.699* -0.721*
Communication (0.326) (0.325) (0.401) (0.402) (0.385) (0.385)
Financial Services 0.358 0.456 0.702** 0.753** 0.937*** 1.028***
(0.336) (0.324) (0.348) (0.352) (0.357) (0.340)
Other Business -0.706** -0.760** -0.581* -0.597* -0.035 -0.069
Services (0.291) (0.327) (0.338) (0.361) (0.301) (0.321)
Public -2.018*** -2.056*** -1.180*** -1.211** -0.240 -0.214
Administration (0.494) (0.503) (0.447) (0.444) (0.318) (0.333)
Education -2.725*** -2.979*** -2.540*** -2.610***
(0.443) (0.505) (0.410) (0.434)
Health -2.137*** -2.216*** -2.485*** -2.479***
(0.355) (0.395) (0.364) (0.375)
Other Community -1.171*** -1.149*** -0.803** -0.794** -0.035 0.006
Services (0.360) (0.362) (0.358) (0.358) (0.332) (0.334)
Constant -0.688 -0.737 -1.744*** -1.758*** -2.019*** -2.014***
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(0.571) (0.583) (0.560) (0.543) (0.445) (0.447)
Incremental Effect
of Delegation
Overall (All Jobs) 0.123 0.114 0.110 0.108 0.077 0.073
Complex Jobs -0.110 -0.011 -0.100
Simple Jobs 0.147 0.122 0.108
Sample Size 1242 1242 1242 1242 1193 1193
Note 1: This table is the same as Table 2 except that it includes the variable Risk as a control.
Results are probit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses below each estimate.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, is denoted by *, **, and ***,
using two-tailed tests. Reference group for industry dummies is Wholesale and Retail.
Note 2: The overall incremental effect of Delegation (for all jobs) is the average value over all
sample observations of the predicted values of
Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) = 1 | Delegation = 1)−Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g.) = 1 | Delegation = 0)
evaluating Complex at its observed value for each observation. The incremental effect of
Delegation for “Complex” jobs is the average value over all sample observations of the predicted
values of Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g) = 1 | Complex = 1 and Delegation =
1)− Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g) = 1 | Complex = 1 and Delegation = 0). The incremental effect of
Delegation for “Simple” is the average value over all sample observations of
Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g) = 1 | Complex = 0 and Delegation = 1)− Prob(Incentive Pay(l.o.g) =
1 | Complex = 0 and Delegation = 0).
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Appendix C
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the “no delegation” problem. Notice that sL
maximizes the principal’s expected profit when task L is chosen, and sH maximizes
the principal’s expected profit when task H is chosen. Thus the principal’s expected
profit from choosing task L is
sL
c
− s
2
L
2c
− ηs
2
Lσ
2
a
2
− w0 − C. (1)
Substituting sL in (1), the principal’s expected profit can be rewritten as
1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
− w0 − C.
Similarly, the principal’s expected profit from choosing task H is given by
−
R(ξ) +
sH
c
− s
2
H
2c
− ηs
2
H(σ
2
a + α)
2
− w0 − C, (2)
which can be rewritten as
−
R(ξ) +
1
2c(1 + ηc(σ2a + α))
− w0 − C.
We assume that if the principal is indifferent between task L and task H, he
always chooses task L. Thus task H is optimal if and only if
−
R(ξ) +
1
2c(1 + ηc(σ2a + α))
>
1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
. (3)
When
−
R(ξ) ≥ 1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
, the inequality in (3) holds. Thus x∗n = H, and
s∗n = sH .
Next, consider the delegation problem. First, notice that the “no delegation”
solution with the incentive-task pair (sH , H) is implementable in the “delegation”
problem if and only if it satisfies (ICxd), which is given by the condition
sH
−
R(ξ)− ηs
2
Hα
2
≥ 0.
Substituting sH and rearranging, we get
α(1− 2
−
R(ξ)c) ≤ 2ξ
η
(1 + ηcσ2a)
.
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We can rearrange the expression above to get
α ≤ 2ξ
η
(1 + ηcσ2a)
(1− 2ξc) = αd
.
Thus, when α ≤ αd, we must have x∗d = H and s∗d = sH .
Next suppose α > αd. We compare two cases, one where the principal imple-
ments task H and the other where the principal implements task L.
Suppose the principal implements task H. Then, the principal’s problem after
substituting (IRd) and (ICad) into the expected profit function is
Max
sd
sd
c
− s
2
d
2c
− ηs
2
d(σ
2
a + α)
2
+
−
R(ξ)− w0
subject to (ICxd) which can be written as
sd ≤
2
−
R(ξ)
ηα
(4)
The first order necessary conditions imply
1
c
− sd
c
− ηsd(σ2a + α) = µ (5)
where µ is the non-negative multiplier associated with (4).
Since α > αd, it follows that
2
−
R(ξ)
ηα
< sH . Also, note that the principal’s profit
after substituting (IRd) and (ICad) is strictly concave in sd and that the left-hand
side of (5) is equal to 0 when sd = sH . Thus, for any sd satisfying (4), the left-hand
side of (5) is strictly positive. From the complementary slackness condition, (4)
always binds.
Thus, the principal’s expected profit if he implements H is
−
R(ξ) +
2
−
R(ξ)
ηαc
− 2
−
R(ξ)2(1 + ηcσ2a)
η2α2c
− 2
−
R(ξ)2
ηα
− w0 (6)
Next, suppose the principal implements task L. Then (ICxd) can be written
as sd ≥
2
−
R(ξ)
ηα
. Since sH >
2
−
R(ξ)
ηα
when α > αd, and since sL > sH , it follows
that the incentive level sL and task L always satisfy (ICxd). Since sL maximizes
the principal’s expected profit subject to (IRd) and (ICad) when x is fixed at L, it
follows that the principal always chooses sL when he implements the task L. Thus
the principal’s expected profit if he implements task L is
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12c(1 + ηcσ2a)
− w0. (7)
At the optimum, the principal implements H if and only if
−
R(ξ) +
2
−
R(ξ)
ηαc
− 2
−
R(ξ)2(1 + ηcσ2a)
η2α2c
− 2
−
R(ξ)2
ηα
>
1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
. (8)
Since
−
R(ξ) ≥ 1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
, the inequality in (8) holds when
2
−
R(ξ)
ηαc
(1−
−
R(ξ)(1 + ηcσ2a)
ηα
−
−
R(ξ)c) > 0,
which can be written as
1−
−
R(ξ)(1 + ηcσ2a)
ηα
−
−
R(ξ)c > 0.
When α > αd, the condition above always holds. Thus the principal always
implements H at the optimum in the delegation problem. Thus for α > αd it
follows that s∗d =
2
−
R(ξ)
ηα
< sH = s
∗
n.
Proof of Proposition 2: The principal prefers to delegate authority if and
only if
−
R(ξ) +
sH
c
− s
2
H
2c
− ηs
2
H(σ
2
a + α)
2
− w0 − C ≤
−
R(ξ) +
s∗d
c
− s
∗2
d
2c
− ηs
∗2
d (σ
2
a + α)
2
− w0.
Thus
−
C = (sH − s∗d)(
1
c
− sH + s
∗
d
2c
− η(σ
2
a + α)(sH + s
∗
d)
2
). (9)
Since s∗d < sH from Proposition 1, it follows that
−
C > 0.
To see how
−
C varies with parameters, first consider the parameter ξ and let ξ′ >
ξ. Let s∗d(ξ) denote optimal incentive levels as a function of ξ for the “delegation”
problem. Since
2
−
R(ξ)
ηα
is strictly increasing in ξ, it follows from Proposition 1 that
s∗d(ξ
′) > s∗d(ξ). Thus from (9) we have
−
C(ξ) >
−
C(ξ′) = 0.
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Next, consider the parameter σ2a and let σ
2
a
′
> σ2a. Notice that we can rewrite
(9) as
(
sH − s∗d
2c
)(1− s∗d(1 + ηc(σ2a + α))), (10)
which is strictly decreasing in σ2a.
Thus
−
C(ξ, α, σ2a
′
) <
−
C(ξ, α, σ2a). 
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the “no delegation” problem. Regardless of
the task that the principal chooses, he will always set s′ =
1
1 + ηcσ2a
at the optimum.
If he chooses task L his expected profit is
s′
c
− s
′2
2c
− ηs
′2σ2a
2
+BL − w0 − C. (11)
and if he chooses task H, his expected profit is
s′
c
− s
′2
2c
− ηs
′2σ2a
2
+
−
R(ξ) +BH − w0 − C. (12)
The principal prefers task H over task L if and only if
−
R(ξ) +BH ≥ BL (13)
Now, consider the “delegation” problem. Suppose
−
R(ξ) + BH < BL so that
the principal’s optimal solution in the “no delegation” problem is (s′, L). Given s’,
the agent picks task L over task H, because s′
−
R(ξ) + BH < BL. Thus the “no
delegation” solution is implementable when authority is delegated.
Suppose, on the other hand that
−
R(ξ)+BH ≥ BL. The “no delegation” solution
(s′, H) is implementable when authority is delegated, if and only if
s′
−
R(ξ) +BH ≥ BL (14)
If
−
R(ξ) +BH ≥ BL and s′
−
R(ξ) +BH < BL, then the principal has two choices.
First suppose he implements task H. Then, the principal’s problem after substitut-
ing (IRd) and (ICad) into the expected profit function is
Max
sd
sd
c
− s
2
d
2c
− ηs
2
dσ
2
a
2
+
−
R(ξ) +BH − w0
subject to (ICxd) which can be written as
sd
−
R(ξ) +BH ≥ BL (16)
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The first order necessary conditions imply
1
c
− sd
c
− ηsdσ2a = −µ
−
R(ξ) (17)
where µ is the non-negative multiplier associated with (16). At the optimum,
it must be the case that µ > 0. If not, then sd = s
′ and because (14) does not
hold, the incentive constraint in (16) is violated, leading to a contradiction. Thus
sd =
BL −BH
−
R(ξ)
> s′ and the principal’s expected profit is given by
BL −BH
−
R(ξ)c
− 1
2c
(
BL −BH
−
R(ξ)
)2 − ησ
2
a
2
(
BL −BH
−
R(ξ)
)2 +
−
R(ξ) +BH − w0 (18)
Next, suppose the principal implements task L. Then (ICxd) can be written
as sd
−
R(ξ) + BH ≤ BL. Notice that s′ satisfies this constraint. Since s′ maximizes
the principal’s expected profit subject to (IRd) and (ICad) when x is fixed at L, it
follows that the principal always chooses s′ when he implements the task L. So the
principal’s expected profit if he implements task L is
1
2c(1 + ηcσ2a)
+BL − w0. (19)
Thus it follows that s∗d ≥ s′ = s∗n. In fact, when
BL −BH
−
R(ξ)
is sufficiently close
to s′ the principal will strictly prefer to induce task H when he delegates authority
leading to s∗d > s
′ = s∗n. 
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